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1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, a body of literature has emerged that establishes the various 
transmission channels through which corruption can constrain economic development. For 
example, corruption when defined as the “abuse of entrusted power for private gain”1 is 
found to have corrosive effects on economic development through increasing transaction 
costs and uncertainty (Murphy et al., 1991), inefficient investments (Mauro, 1995; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1993), reduced human capital development (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005) and 
misallocation of resources (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 
Recently, attention has shifted to another important but less explored micro-level channel, i.e. 
the operation and regulation of electricity systems particularly in developing countries 
(Wren-Lewis, 2015; Estache et al., 2009; Dal Bó, 2006; Bergara et al., 1998). The 
preponderance of evidence from this strand of literature suggests that, corruption can cripple 
economic development by inhibiting the performance of the electricity sector. For instance, 
corruption reduces labour productivity (Wren-Lewis, 2015; Dal Bó, 2006), increases 
transmission and distribution losses and constrains the efforts to increase access to electricity 
services (see Estache et al., 2009). 
The impacts of corruption on electricity sector performance is particularly relevant in the 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) context, where welfare improvements can intuitively be linked to 
corruption (Gyimah-Brempong and Camacho, 2006), which appears to be widespread. 
Despite the obvious difficulties of measuring corruption, the Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) produced by Transparency International (TI, 2013) shows that, eight out of the twenty 
most corrupt countries in the world were SSA countries, and the only region with more than 
two countries in this group. Thus, in weak institutional environments, major undertakings 
such as the construction of large hydroelectric dams, government intervention in the 
operations of utilities, monopolistic characteristics of the sector, absence of competition and 
the substantial revenues from the sales of electricity can attract and make the sector 
vulnerable to corruption (Bosshard, 2005; World Bank, 2009; Reinikka and Svensson, 2005). 
The above factors could be partly blamed for turning the electricity sectors in SSA countries 
into sources of corruption and cronyism (Patterson, 1999) and the concentration of electricity 
services to urban areas whilst rural areas remained unconnected or underserved (Byrne and 
Mun, 2003). This is referred to as ‘electricity poverty’ and is widespread in the region.2 In 
order to improve efficiency and reduce corruption, many SSA countries implemented some 
form of Electricity Sector Reforms (ESR) (Eberhard et al., 2016). The reforms, also referred 
to as ‘standard electricity sector reform model’ and often prescribed to developing countries 
by multilateral development organisations, were first implemented in OECD countries such 
as Chile, Norway and the UK in the 1980s and 1990s. 
                                                          
1
 See Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1997) for discussions on this definition. 
2
According to IEA (2014), the majority of the estimated 500 million people that lack access to clean and 
affordable electricity in the region are poor and rely on traditional biomass – wood, agriculture residues and 
dung – for cooking and heating. 
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The experiences of these pioneer countries supported the notion that effective implementation 
of ESRs would not only enhance technical efficiency of the sector, but would also translate 
the efficiency gains into social welfare and economic growth (Sen et al., 2016). Moreover, 
according to the World Bank (2000), as part of wider economic liberalisation, deregulation 
and de-monopolisation policies, ESR policies were further underpinned by anticorruption 
agendas. Thus, reformers not only promised improved efficiency and wider access to reliable 
and affordable services, they also promised to reduce corruption in the sector (Estache et al., 
2009) and the wider economy (World Bank, 2000). 
Despite the anticipated positive outcomes from implementation of the ESRs, there are 
widespread perceptions that reforms have hurt the poor through increased tariffs, stronger 
enforcement of bills collection (Scott and Seth, 2013) and unemployment, while benefitting 
the powerful and wealthy notably through corruption (Auriol and Blanc, 2009). As a result, 
the reforms often lacked social legitimacy, and this usually manifests through increases in 
electricity theft and vandalism (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006). Moreover, as Estache et al. 
(2009) have noted, large numbers of people believe that corruption remains a problem in the 
sector. However, despite the anecdotes that connect corruption to sector performance after the 
reform efforts, there is a lack of empirical evidence on whether the electricity sector reforms 
implemented in SSA region have mitigated or indeed exacerbated the effect of corruption in 
the electricity sector. 
Previous empirical studies have shown the relevance of corruption as a driver of ESR in 
developing countries, but they either focus on labour efficiency in electricity distribution 
firms (e.g., Wren-Lewis, 2015; Dal Bó and Rossi, 2007) or on different sectors (e.g., Estache 
et al., 2009). Moreover, the former two studies focused on Latin American countries while 
the latter study also includes countries from different developing regions of the world. 
Therefore, to our knowledge, this is the first empirical study to assess the electricity reforms 
in SSA countries and among the few studies that examine the interactions between country 
level institutions and micro-level electricity reform steps (e.g., Wren-Lewis, 2015; Estache et 
al., 2009). Most studies of this strand of literature tend to focus on specific aspects of the 
textbook reform model or on specific countries without explicitly accounting for the role of 
institutions apart from those earlier mentioned. 
The paper addresses the deficit in the literature and contributes to better understanding the 
institutional aspect of electricity reforms (e.g., Dorman, 2014; Chang and Berdiev, 2011; 
Nepal and Jamasb, 2012a; Cubbin and Stern, 2006; Erdogdu, 2013) and the political 
economy literature of regulatory agencies (e.g., Pitlik, 2007; Potrafle, 2010; Scott and Seth, 
2013). The paper also indirectly contributes to the literature on obsolescing bargaining 
(Vernon, 1971) since political corruption entails government commitment to honour the 
terms of electricity reforms and particularly the privatisation of state assets, could be doubtful. 
Thus, the findings would give further insights into why investments in the SSA electricity 
markets tend to be more concentrated in the generation segment than in the distribution 
utilities since the former is more vulnerable to corruption. 
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the nearly three 
decades of ESR implementations in SSA countries and discusses how each of the key steps of 
the reform model may mitigate the adverse effects of corruption on the performance of the 
electricity reforms. Section 3 presents three research hypotheses related to key performance 
aspects of the reforms to be tested. Section 4 presents the empirical methodology and the data 
used in the study. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Electricity Sector Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Historically, the generation, supply and marketing of electricity in most SSA countries, as in 
many other countries in the world, were dominated by vertically integrated state-owned 
utilities (Clark et al., 2005). These arrangements were partly due to factors regarded as 
primary functions of the state, such as, the high fixed costs of large plants, the desire of 
governments to enhance welfare, national security concerns, social equity objectives (World 
Bank, 1993) and ideological reasons (Erdogdu, 2013). The state-ownership of utilities were 
further reinforced by the idea that permitting more than one firm to provide electricity would 
rather rise, than reduce, costs which resulted in historically higher investments by the state in 
public utilities relative to private investments (USAID, 2005). However, the 1980s and 1990s 
saw SSA countries, similar to other developing countries, becoming increasingly unable to 
sustain their investments in the sector. Decades of government investments had not produced 
the anticipated increase in performance, as services remained largely concentrated to urban 
areas, nor were there improvements in quality and reliability of services. 
At the same time, macroeconomic conditions external to the sector, such as, the deteriorating 
international business climate, fiscal constraints faced by governments, structural adjustment 
programmes, which later became part of lending conditions of the IMF and World Bank 
(Jamasb, 2006) compelled SSA countries to undertake structural and institutional reforms of 
their electricity sectors. Moreover, many of the arguments that supported state ownership of 
electricity utilities disappeared by the 1980s as the economies of scale associated with 
vertically integrated electricity utilities had exhausted (Joskow, 2006; Gilbert et al., 1996), 
therefore state-ownership of the sector came to be seen as a major hindrance for the 
introduction of new technologies developed mostly by the private sector (Downing et al., 
2006). The reform efforts in SSA were triggered by investment shortage and concerns that 
monopolisation of electricity generation and supply activities by state-owned utilities were 
wasteful and inefficient (Victor, 2005). 
The first electricity sector reform was first introduced in Chile, which later spread to other 
OECD countries such as, Norway and United Kingdom. From the experiences of these 
countries, emerged the theory and practice of the ‘standard textbook reform model’ that later 
became widely prescribed to developing countries by the IMF and World Bank. It was 
believed that reforms would reduce the dominance of the state in the sector through creation 
of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) and private sector participation in electricity 
markets (Jamasb et al., 2016). The expected outcome of these efforts are the enhancements of 
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economic and technical efficiency of utilities and the transfer of the efficiency gains to 
consumers in the form improved access to affordable and reliable electricity services (Nepal 
and Jamasb, 2012b; Estache et al., 2009). 
The standard reform model advocated for the unbundling of state-owned electricity utilities 
vertically (generation, transmission, distribution and retailing) and horizontally (generation 
and retailing). The unbundled parts amenable to competition would then be sold to the private 
sector and an IRA created by the state would then supervise and regulate the monopoly-prone 
parts of the sector (Victor and Heller, 2007). Table 1 summarizes the factors that motivated 
ESR in developed and developing countries. The Table shows that, the electricity sector 
specific and external factors (factor outside the sector) that triggered ESR varied differed 
between developed and developing countries. 
 
Electricity Sector Drivers External Drivers 
Developed countries: 
Excess capacity, use of costly generation 
technologies, economic inefficiencies, 
growing consumer demand for cheap 
energy. 
Developed countries: 
Lack of political and economic ideologies: 
faith in the market, competition and 
privatisation. 
 
OECD energy deregulation: creation of new 
energy multinationals looking for new 
investments opportunities. 
 
Technological innovation: for instance, the 
development of Combined Cycle Gas 
Turbine (CCGT) plants. 
Developing countries: 
Lack of public investment to meet growing 
demand, institutional inefficiencies, 
burden of price subsidies, high electricity 
losses, poor quality of service and 
coverage, capacity shortages, poor 
electricity sector investments. 
 
Developing countries: 
Macroeconomic factors: such as the post-
Soviet economic transition (1989), Latin 
American debt crisis (1980s), Asian 
financial crisis (1997-1998). 
 
Lending policies of donors: such as those of 
the IMF and World Bank with strings 
attached. 
 
National economic reform context: as the 
result of economic crisis and structural 
adjustment programmes. 
Table 1: Drivers of Electricity Reforms in Developed and Developing Countries 
Source: Jamasb et al. (2016) 
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However, as pointed out in Nepal (2013), the extent and outcome of electricity reforms have 
differed between developed and developing countries. The reforms in developed countries 
were undertaken in the context of excess capacity and relatively stable institutions aimed at 
improving economic and financial performance of technically reliable systems, encourage 
interregional trade, transfer investment risks to the private sector, offer consumers alternative 
choices, and reduce overinvestment in the sector (Jamasb et al., 2014; Erdogdu, 2013). 
Conversely, ESR in the developing countries were implemented within a context of poor 
technical and financial performances of state-owned electricity utilities, weak institutional 
setting, the inabilities of both utilities and governments to mobilise sufficient investments to 
expand electricity services, low tariffs and poor service quality (Jamasb et al., 2005). 
However, the appropriateness of the standard ESR model for developing countries has been 
questioned as its implementations usually resulted in higher prices, loss of employment, 
unreliable services, and concentration of services to profitable areas since the private firms 
did not have incentives to extend the service to poor areas (Transnational Institute, 2002; 
Victor, 2005). Thus, in the unprofitable segments of the market there has been almost total 
absence of service provision (Auriol and Picard, 2006). The poor access rates in SSA relative 
to other developing regions may be partly attributed to this lack of incentives. For example, 
although between 2000 and 2014, there was some progress in increasing access to electricity 
in all developing regions of the world; electricity access deficit is overwhelmingly 
concentrated in SSA region, as progress has fallen consistently short of population growth. 
The poor outcomes have led the reform critics to argue that since costly electricity 
infrastructures needed to extend services to rural and poor areas are considered risky and 
unprofitable by the private sector, the state should undertake such investments since it enjoys 
a monopoly on capital and investments (Victor, 2005). 
Moreover, the experiences of ESR around the world have shown the difficulty of creating an 
economically efficient electricity sector underpinned by genuine competitive markets that 
show significant potentials to benefit consumers through reliable service, low tariffs, and 
choice of alternative sources (IEA, 2014). As a result, the reform experience in SSA countries 
has lagged behind the anticipated outcomes of the standard reform model and thus has led to 
extensive political backlash against reforms. Higher electricity prices have been an obvious 
source of political resistance in many countries, especially for groups that have become 
accustomed to paying near nothing for electricity services (Victor, 2005) and this resistance 
was further reinforced by the awareness that elections can be won or lost because of 
electricity prices (UNDP and World Bank, 2005). 
However, despite the difficulties of ESR in developing countries, they have not deterred SSA 
countries from implementing some aspects of the textbook reform model. Twenty four 
countries in the region have enacted ESR law, three-quarter have attracted private 
participation, nearly all have corporatized their electricity utilities, two-thirds have set-up 
regulatory bodies, and more than a third have Independent Power Producers (IPPs) in place 
(Eberhard et al., 2016). Table 2 summarises the reform efforts in some SSA countries. 
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No ESR  
Initiated 
Vertically 
integrated 
w. priv.
* 
Vertically 
integrated 
w. IRA only 
Vertically  
integrated w. 
IRA and priv. 
Unbundled w. 
IRA and priv. 
Unbundled 
w. IRA only 
Benin 
Burundi 
Central 
African Rep. 
Djibouti 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Eritrea 
Somalia 
Seychelles 
Congo Dem. 
Rep. 
Guinea 
Botswana 
Chad 
Madagascar 
Mauritius  
Liberia 
Guinea 
Bissau 
Comoros  
Congo, Rep 
Mauritania Angola 
Burkina Faso 
Cape Verde 
Cameroon 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Ethiopia 
Gabon  
Gambia 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Lesotho 
Rwanda 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Senegal 
South Africa 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Zambia 
Ghana 
Kenya
** 
Nigeria 
Uganda 
Zimbabwe
**
 
Sudan 
Niger 
Swaziland  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*
All forms of private participation excluding management contracts, lease contracts and concession. 
**
Kenya and Zimbabwe have only undertaken partial unbundling unlike the other three countries that 
have fully unbundled. 
Table 2: Implementations of Electricity Sector Reforms in SSA countries 
Sources: Eberhard et al. (2016) and World Bank Infrastructure Database (2017) 
 
3. The Literature on Corruption and Reform 
As argued by the World Bank (2000), electricity sector reforms have the potential not only to 
improve technical efficiency of the sector but also to reduce the corruption associated with 
state-ownership. This section reviews the relevant literature on how each key aspect of the 
reforms can mitigate the adverse effects of corruption. 
3.1. Corruption and Corporatization/Commercialization 
The most pervasive aspect of the reform model implemented in SSA was the transformations 
of incumbent state-owned utilities into separate legal entities through corporatization or 
commercialization.
3
 Although, the corporatized utilities were distinct from government 
ministries or energy departments, they are however, treated as a commercial enterprise and 
thus, expected to pay interest and taxes, and earn commercially competitive rates of return on 
equity capital. They can also plan and execute budgets, and initiate and implement borrowing 
procurement and employment conditions (Kapika and Eberhard, 2013). 
                                                          
3
 See Appendix A for the types, names of projects and status of management contracts in some SSA countries. 
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Although independent and incorporated under the same laws governing private corporations, 
the state retains ownership of corporatized utilities and in some cases runs them through 
appointed independent board of directors. However, in countries such as Cameroon, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Namibia, Madagascar and Ghana their business decisions were contracted 
out to private managers
4
 (Ghanadan and Eberhard, 2007). Whether managed by an appointed 
board of directors or private contractors, corporatizations of utilities were mainly aimed at 
reducing the inefficiencies induced by government interference in the operations of utilities, 
facilitate the entry of private capital and move utilities toward cost-recovery in pricing 
through improved metering, billing and collection (Eberhard and Gratwick, 2011). 
Corporatized utilities have achieved modest performance improvements especially those 
operated by management contractors. In Tanzania, a management contractor used a poverty 
tariff for consumers using 50 kilowatt hour (kWh) a month or less and nearly doubled the 
revenues of the corporatized utility (TANESCO) by reducing costs by 30%, rising collection 
rates from 67 to 93%, reducing system energy losses by 5%, and connecting 30,000 new 
customers (Ghanadan and Eberhard, 2007). Similarly, a management contractor in Namibia 
between 1996 and 2002 succeeded in doubling the electricity consumers, and increasing 
labour productivity without laying-off employees (Clark et al., 2005). 
These positive outcomes and others such as improvements in bills collections and reductions 
in system losses in almost all SSA with management contractors, made international aid 
agencies such as the IMF and World Bank involved in almost all management contracts, to 
regard them as a first step towards comprehensive reforms of the sector. However, 
contracting out operations of utilities to the private sector has proved to be complex and 
contentious in some countries of the region. For example, most governments were unwilling 
to honour their financial obligations needed to expand capacities, reject tariff hikes (e.g., in 
Senegal), unwilling to compel other government agencies to pay their bills, forbidding 
utilities from reducing the size of the workforce or disconnecting delinquent consumers 
(Nellis, 2005). 
Other stakeholders removed from management positions, and the thousands of employees 
laid off criticised such contracts especially where large contract fees were paid to 
management contractors (e.g., Tanzania and aid agencies paid for the 56 months’ contract 
period, $8.5 million in fixed fees and $8.9 million in performance based fees) (Eberhard and 
Gratwick, 2011). The large payouts were further argued not to be in commensurate with the 
modest improvements in finances of utilities and this helped galvanised political backlash 
against management contracts in the region. Moreover, it was argued that, many regulators 
failed to capture the benefits from the efficiency gains and competition produced by 
management contractors (Nellis, 2005). As a result, management contracts were viewed by 
policymakers in SSA as unsustainable, thus 16 of management contracts engaged in the 
region, 4 were cancelled before their expiration dates, 12 were allowed to expire after their 
initial terms, and only in Liberia and Lesotho there are management contracts currently 
                                                          
4
 Some SSA countries contracted out the operation and management of their corporatized utilities to 
management contractors. 
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active. According to Eberhard and Gratwick (2011), of all the countries with management 
contracts, only those engaged in Gabon and Mali have led to further reforms. 
The eventual disengagement of management contractors from most SSA countries shows that 
state-owned utilities managed by government appointees are once again becoming the most 
dominant players in the sector. Under state-ownership, there are temptations on part of some 
governments to force utilities to charge electricity prices below the costs of generation and 
supply, dictate the choice of plants locations or mandate utilities to purchase their primary 
energy from state-owned national energy (e.g., oil and gas) companies (Nellis, 2005) even 
while lower cost alternatives exist. Thus, it became increasing difficult to insulate 
corporatized utilities from corruption usually associated with state ownership of utilities, 
which has been one of the key motivators of the reforms in the region. 
3.2. Corruption, Unbundling and Competition 
In order to target the sources of inefficiency such as corruption and reduce their performance 
impacts, reformers advocated for the introduction of competitive electricity markets after the 
sector has been unbundled both vertically and horizontally. Thus, irrespective of ownership 
status, reformers anticipate that competition between the unbundled segments and among 
generating plants offer a reliable mechanism to reduce network energy losses and induce full 
capacity usage. These efficiency gains are then expected to increase access rates, while at the 
same time reducing the cost of service to pre-existing consumers (Zhang et al., 2008). More 
importantly, the unbundling and the subsequent competition entails consumers to have more 
freedom of choice compared to when services were provided by a state-owned monopolist 
with incentives to withhold capacity or determine areas to concentrate services. This freedom 
of choice therefore means consumers can escape from corruption hitherto associated with 
government ownership of utilities. 
Although, countries such as Ghana, Zambia, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe have 
indicated their intention to introduce market competition, this has not materialised. As a 
result, only Nigeria has taken steps towards wholesale competition after unbundling and 
privatising its generation and distribution segments (Gratwick et al., 2006).
5
 Although, the 
lack of competition in electricity markets of SSA countries can partly be linked to the 
difficulties of reforming small systems, the absence of private participation in countries such 
as Sudan,
6
 indicates that governance issues are still at the core of the electricity reform efforts 
in many countries.  
Despite the governance enhancing virtues of competition, experience reveals the difficulties 
of creating genuine competitive electricity markets even in developed countries which are 
usually associated with strong institutions. In Britain, the 15 electricity utilities that emerged 
from the reforms of the 1990s re-integrated and consolidated to just six utilities after 5 years. 
This has led to the perception that the utilities tacitly collude to charge consumers higher 
                                                          
5
 Nigeria established a Transitional Electricity Market (TEM) on February 1, 2015. 
6
 Sudan has successfully unbundled its electricity market both vertically and horizontally, and has also 
established an IRA. 
10 
 
prices (Lewis, 2014). Similarly, the idea that the market would discipline competing 
electricity firms and thereby benefit consumers was tested by the California power crisis. 
Byrne and Mun (2003) reported that various participants in California electricity market 
succeeded in gaming the system to maximise short-term profits by creating artificial scarcity 
through adjusting their bidding strategies. Therefore, rather than to lower prices, the day-
ahead, hour-ahead, and real-electricity markets actually led to increases in prices. 
In the SSA context, the emergence of hybrid electricity markets and the absence of robust 
anti-competitive laws may explain the absence of competitive electricity markets apart from 
the TEM in Nigeria and the predominance of private sector participation largely in the form 
of IPPs. This is because implementation of retail or wholesale competitive markets requires 
sophisticated institutional and financial infrastructures, which are inadequate in SSA 
(Eberhard et al., 2016). In order to mitigate investment risk in weak institutional 
environments, private sector participants such as IPPs usually enter into power purchase 
agreements with the incumbent off-takers by requiring measures such as government 
guarantees, and the inclusion of international arbitration clauses. 
3.3. Corruption and Private Sector Participation 
In order to attract investments reformers advocated total privatisation of state-owned utilities 
to complement other forms of private sector participation. The withdrawal of the state from 
the sector would not only attract the needed extra private sector investments, but would also 
reduce the burden of subsidies on the government to cover finance overruns of state-owned 
utilities. Therefore, privatisation has the potential to reduce political interference or 
bureaucratic rigidities in the operations and management of utilities since control rights over 
these factors would no longer be under the direct control of politicians or civil servants. 
This suggests that privatisation can improve electricity sector governance through changing 
the incentive structure in the sector. For example, since the new owners of privatised utilities 
are now the residual claimants of revenue generated by service provision, it would incentivise 
them to close all types of inefficiencies including those related to corruption (Olson, 2000). 
This differs considerably from when services were provided by the previously state-owned 
utilities without clear residual claimants, and thus no incentives to reduce inefficiencies 
especially those related to corruption. This argument was highlighted by the theoretical works 
of Shapiro and Willig (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Boycko et al. (1996) who 
argued that privatisation makes it difficult for corrupt politicians and bureaucrats to control 
rents produced by privatised utilities. In other words, privatised firms become more 
productive and profitable relative to state-owned by closing the sources of inefficiencies 
including those related to government corruption. 
Despite the increase in private sector participation after the financial crisis of 2008 in SSA 
electricity markets (Figure 1), there remains a funding gap for connecting the estimated 500 
million people without access to electricity services in the SSA region (IEA, 2014). The 
African Development Bank (ADB, 2010) notes that social welfare improvements and 
productivity in the region, continues to be constrained by the inadequate generation capacity, 
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large technical and commercial losses, limited electrification rates, unreliable services, and 
high electricity tariffs. 
For example, in terms of generation capacity, the entire installed generation capacity of 48 
SSA countries was 83 gigawatts (GW) in 2012, and when South Africa is excluded, the 
figure drops to 36 GW, and just 13 of the remaining countries have power systems larger than 
1 GW (Eberhard et al., 2016). Moreover, one-quarter of that capacity is unavailable due to 
aging plants and poor maintenance (Eberhard et al., 2008). The investments required to close 
this gap are large. It was estimated that, in order to keep pace with projected economic 
growth, to meet suppressed demand and provide additional capacity to achieve universal 
access, up to 7 GW in new generation capacity were required annually between 2005 and 
2015 (Eberhard and Gratwick, 2011). The authors estimated that, it would cost about US$15 
billion to add new generation capacities and a further US$5 billion annually for the operation 
and maintenance of existing generation plants and transmission networks. If the current trend 
continues, less than 40% of the SSA countries will be able to achieve universal access by 
2050 (IEA, 2016). 
 
Figure 1: IPP Investments in SSA Countries, 1990-2016 
Source: World Bank PPI Database 
 
3.4. Corruption and Independent Regulatory Agencies 
Previous studies have linked huge energy shortages and investment gap to historical, 
financial, social, technical, and economic factors (e.g., Jamasb et al., 2016; Dornan, 2014; 
Eberhard and Gratwick, 2011). Recently other studies have attempted to link the poor 
outcomes to the failure of IRAs to improve the institutional conditions of the sector as private 
investors largely depend on their credibility and independence when investing in countries 
with weak institutions. Moreover, the emergence of hybrid electricity markets which does not 
entail total withdrawal of the state from the electricity sector (Eberhard et al., 2016),
7
 have 
                                                          
7
 This is one of the key factors often suggested for the vulnerability of the electricity sector to corruption. 
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made the IRAs to struggle to balance the interests of private utilities and the dominant state-
owned utilities. 
Thus, in the context of weak institutional environments such as those of SSA countries, 
political expediency tied to the state-owned utilities tends to undermine the independence of 
the IRAs (Eberhard, 2007). For example, in some SSA countries where IRAs have attempted 
to exert their independence there has been a high turnover among the board members and 
management (Kapika and Eberhard, 2013). As a result, the regulatory frameworks in these 
countries are often viewed as compromised. This in turn leads many consumers to assume 
that the utilities are in collusion with the IRAs and make excessive profits since the 
regulatory framework has become prone to political capture or a tool for corrupt government 
officials (Stiglitz, 1998). 
Moreover, despite the importance of IRAs in providing right institutional environment for 
investors to thrive and give consumers the necessary protection, the reform efforts in the 
region shows that not all countries have set up IRAs. For example, according to Eberhard et 
al. (2016) as of 2014, only 26 of the SSA countries have set up IRAs, while in the remaining 
countries, energy ministries or departments have assumed regulatory responsibilities with the 
aim of achieving specific social and economic objectives.
 
Thus, in this later group of 
countries, governments have full regulatory discretion in determining monitoring and 
enforcing maximum tariffs and minimum service standards.  
Some have argued that self-regulation usually allows corruption to be pervasive in the 
operations of utilities as most positions in IRAs are usually staffed with friends, family, or 
political and financial allies of politicians (Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2010). Similarly, even 
in countries that have set up independent regulatory agencies, it has often been difficult for 
these new bodies to escape from political interference and pressure and various forms of 
corruption (Spiller, 1990).
8
 
The preceding paragraphs suggest that the strategic nature of electricity to the economies of 
SSA countries implies that the wider fragmented socio-political and economic environments 
may largely influence guidelines on electricity generation, and transmission and distribution. 
Thus, in such weak institutional environments, the efficient operation of electricity networks 
could be influenced by the private agendas of regulators/government energy departments or 
government corruption. Despite these links between weak institutions and performance of the 
utilities, the issue of how corruption and weak governance might influence the electricity 
sector performance post reforms in SSA has been neglected in both the electricity sector 
reforms literature and the current policy approaches pursued by SSA governments. In order to 
fill this gap, we analyse whether the implementations of ESR have offset or exacerbated the 
negative influence of corruption on performance. 
 
                                                          
8
 Only 26 of a total of 47 SSA countries included in our study have established independent energy regulatory 
agencies. 
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3.5. Hypotheses 
As noted in the introduction section, the main objective of ESR in SSA countries was to 
improve technical efficiency and translating this gain into increase access rates and keep up 
with the projected economic growth. In order to develop a set of hypotheses to test whether 
these objectives have been achieved, we rely on the literature on corruption in regulated 
sectors that on how a well-designed regulatory framework may insulate firms from corruption 
(e.g., Levy and Spiller, 1994; Laffont and Tirole, 1986; Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2009). 
We are further guided by the economic development literature that shows how economic 
performance could be affected indirectly through the impact of corruption on private 
investment (e.g., Wei, 2000). Thus, we draw on these varied set of literature to identify three 
potential indicators of electricity sector performance to assess the corruption reducing 
potentials of ESR policies. The variables in included in our dataset are placed into three 
categories each reflecting three different dimensions of performance – i.e. technical 
efficiency, access rates and economic performance. The first hypothesis focuses on the 
technical efficiency of electricity sector proxy by Transmission and Distribution (T&D) 
losses per capita, and expressed as follows: 
 H1: Electricity sector reforms in SSA countries, by offsetting or overcoming the 
adverse effects of corruption, have improved technical efficiency. 
Theoretically, T&D energy losses is a suitable proxy for the technical efficiency of the sector 
because the higher these losses, the higher the probability that firms are not only undertaking 
needed investments to upgrade and maintain supply networks, but it would also indicate firms 
having operational challenges. More importantly, vandalism, illegal connections and bribes to 
utilities’ workers to avoid full payment of electricity bills would also contribute to higher 
losses as utilities become constrained financially to undertake further investments. These 
factors all combine and adversely affect the overall sustainability and productivity of the 
electricity sector. Therefore, we expect the reforms to enhance investor confidence to 
undertake further investments, improve their operations and close all sources of inefficiencies 
thereby leading to efficiency gains. 
We extend the assessment of impacts of ESR and corruption beyond the sector since one 
motivation of the reforms in SSA countries was to expand affordable and reliable electricity 
services to the un-electrified majority. Therefore, our second hypothesis traces the impacts of 
reforms beyond the sector to analyse the impact of reforms on access to electricity services. 
Previous research has suggested how corruption and clientelistic practices (e.g., Min, 2010) 
can undermine government efforts to extend electricity services to the poor. Therefore, we 
expect the loosening of the ties between the government and utilities, through the creations of 
IRAs and privatization, to reduce corruption usually related to direct government operations 
and regulation of utilities. Moreover, we expect technical efficiency gains from ESR to 
translate into expansion of electricity to those who lack access to the service. Thus, our 
second hypothesis is as follows: 
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 H2: implementation of ESR by reducing the negative association between corruption 
and technical efficiency has increased access rates in SSA countries. 
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2014), ESR implementations will boost 
the economic performance of SSA region by 30% in 2040, not only through new private 
sector investments but also through governance improvements inside and outside the energy 
sector. Moreover, World Bank (2000) notes that ESR as part of wider economic liberalisation 
policies has further anticorruption potentials to reduce the negative association between 
corruption and economic performance. Therefore, due to the positive association between the 
economy and electricity use on the one hand, and the negative association between corruption 
and economic performance, we expect the reforms to boost income levels in two ways. We 
extend the performance impacts of corruption and ESR, to the wider economy and thus 
postulate that: 
 H3: implementations ESR policies in SSA countries have enhanced economic 
performance of SSA countries by reducing negative association between corruption 
and economic growth. 
 
4. Methodology and Data 
4.1. Electricity Sector Performance Equation 
The setup and analysis of the performance equation is influenced by the awareness that ESR 
in developing countries, as in other sectoral reforms, is not an isolated undertaking but is 
closely interlinked with the legal and institutional environments of reforming countries. 
Therefore, in its simplest form, we postulate that electricity sector performance (Y) depends 
not only on the vector of reform policies (REF) implemented by SSA countries but also on 
corruption (cor) which measures the institutional quality of the countries, and a set of vector 
of control variables (X). Thus, our performance output equation can be expressed as: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑝𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑝𝑖𝑡
2
𝑝=1 +  𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽3𝑝
2
𝑝=1 (𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑝𝑖𝑡 · 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡) +   
   𝛽4𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽5𝑞𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑄
𝑞=1 + 𝛽6𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (1) 
where i and t indexes a country and year, Y is performance output reflecting either of the 
three performance indicators: technical efficiency (T&D energy losses; losper), access rate 
(per capita electricity consumption; access), and economic performance (GDP per capita; 
gdpper). βs are the parameters to be estimated, the term time represents a linear time-trend, 
which takes into account technological progress. αi are country-specific effects, included to 
control for time-invariant unobservables and 𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2
), is the stochastic error term. The 
vector of reform policies (REF) consists of independent regulatory agency (ira) and 
privatisation (priv), a proxy for all forms of private sector participation in electricity markets. 
These two reform policies entail whether country i at time t has succeeded in establishing an 
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independent regulatory agency and opened its doors for private participation. The vector of Q 
control variables (X) depends on which of the three performance indicators is used. It 
captures the demand side of the market and consists of GDP per capita (gdpper), total gross 
electricity generation (genper) and, structure (struc) and size (urban) of electricity markets. 
In order to capture the corruption reducing effects of ESR on performance, we follow Estache 
et al. (2009) and Wren-Lewis (2015) and use interaction terms between corruption and the 
two reform policies (iraXcor and privXcor). The coefficients of these two interaction terms 
measure the corruption reducing potential of reforms. We also include an interaction term 
between the two the reform policies (iraXpriv) to assess whether IRAs have constrained or 
improved the performance of privatised utilities or if private utilities have constraint or 
reinforced regulatory activity. This is important because, private investors in electricity 
sectors of developing countries mostly require credible and transparent IRAs to safeguard 
their investments from expropriation by the state.  
Similarly, as noted in the literature on regulatory capture, there is a tendency for regulatory 
capture in regulated electricity markets due to economic incentives that may push  regulators 
to cater for the interest of the regulated (e.g., Olson, 1965; Dal Bó and Di Tella, 2003; Leaver, 
2009). These incentives may arise due to reliance of the regulators on the regulated entity for 
information they need to do their duties and the desire to hold future well-paid jobs with the 
regulated since human capital in the sector tends to be industry-specific. Hence, this is our 
motivation for the inclusion of the third interaction term. 
4.2. Estimation method 
In panel data regressions, the choice of an estimator mostly lies between the Random Effects 
(RE) or Fixed Effects (FE) estimators to deal with the bias of unobserved heterogeneity. 
However, both estimators address the bias at the expense of a strong exogeneity assumption. 
For instance, Equation (1) includes not only country-specific effects that can be correlated 
with other regressors, but also other theoretically established endogenous regressors (e.g., per 
capita GDP), thus the orthogonality condition is not likely to be met for a RE or FE estimator 
to produce consistent estimates. Moreover, Jamasb et al. (2005) note that most ESR 
researchers tend to ignore (implicitly or explicitly) another sources of endogeneity which 
arises from the possibility of current values of ESR variables and past performance being a 
function of past condition or performance. Therefore, the RE and FE estimators do not 
produce consistent coefficient estimates in the presence of endogenous regressors and 
dynamics, and thus it is not possible to make inferences based on their estimates. 
In order to overcome these methodological concerns, we first transform Equation (1) into a 
dynamic panel specification where lagged values of the three indicators of performance, i.e. 
the alternative dependent variables (technical efficiency, access rates and per capita GDP) are 
included as additional regressors. The dynamic performance equation can be expressed as in 
equation (2): 
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    𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝜑𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑝𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑝𝑖𝑡
2
𝑝=1 +  𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽3𝑝
2
𝑝=1 (𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑝𝑖𝑡 · 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡) +  
       𝛽4𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽5𝑞𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑄
𝑞=1 + 𝛽6𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (2) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 presents the lagged value of performance, whilst 𝜑 is the parameter estimate of 
lagged performance. All other variables and coefficients are defined as before. As noted, 
neither the pooled OLS, FE nor RE estimates of 𝜑 are consistent in dynamic models when the 
time span is small (Nickell, 1981). We could consider using the dynamic panel General 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This 
estimator has the potential to produce consistent estimates in the presence of endogeneity of 
regressors, unobserved country fixed effects and dynamics. The estimator first eliminates the 
country-specific effects αi by differencing the model and instrumenting the lagged dependent 
variable (𝑌𝑖𝑡−1) with lagged levels of this variable (Arellano and Bond, 1991). However, 
differencing the data removes all time-invariant variables of interest during the estimation. 
Moreover, the Difference GMM (Diff-GMM) is noted to perform poorly in the presence of 
persistent processes since the lagged levels may convey little information on future changes, 
thus implying the problem of weak instruments and biased estimates (Roodman, 2008). 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) developed a System GMM (Sys-
GMM) estimator to improve the efficiency of the Diff-GMM estimator. The Sys-GMM 
estimator solves the endogeneity problem by treating the model as a system of equations in 
first difference and in levels. The endogenous regressors in the first difference equation are 
instrumented with lags of their levels, whilst the endogenous regressors in the level equation 
are instrumented with the lags of their first differences. The consistency of the Sys-GMM 
estimator depends on the assumption of no serial autocorrelation in the errors and existence 
of an array of exogenous regressors. An important aspect of the estimator is that it relies on 
internal instruments contained within the panel itself and therefore eliminates the need for 
external instruments and it also avoids full specification of the serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity properties of the stochastic error term, or any other distributional 
assumption. 
Despite its advantages, the Sys-GMM estimator has limitations especially as it relies on using 
the lags of both the dependent and independent variables for identification. This would 
potentially give rise to a problem of weak instruments, which is usually magnified as the 
number of instrumental variables increases. Although, increasing the instruments’ lag length 
could make them more exogenous, it may also make them weaker. Furthermore, when using 
panel data estimators such as the Sys-GMM, the bias resulting from errors in regressors may 
also be magnified (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). In order to reduce the influence of these 
and other limitations of the estimator on our results, we avoid the instruments counts 
exceeding the number of countries in the sample or overfitting of the instrumented regressors. 
Thus, we collapse the instrument set as recommended by Roodman (2009) and report the 
instrument count for each of the estimations. 
17 
 
Obtaining consistent, efficient and unbiased results using the Sys-GMM estimator is 
contingent on two specification tests; Hansen test for over-identification restrictions and the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) test for serial correlation (AR) of the disturbances up to the second 
order. The Hansen test of over-identification restrictions is a joint test of model specification 
and appropriateness of the instrument vector. Failure to reject the null hypothesis of the test 
would indicate that the instruments used in estimation are valid and the model has been well 
specified. The appropriate check of the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for serial correlation 
(AR) relates only to the absence of second-order serial correlation (AR2) since the first 
differencing induces first serial correlation in the transformed errors. 
4.3. Data 
The econometric analyses are based on annual country-specific observations from 47 SSA 
countries over the period 2002-2013. Our selection of countries and time period are largely 
determined by data availability. Moreover, since the main aim of paper relates to the 
influence of IRAs and privatization on corruption, the little reforms implemented so far in the 
region would not permit us to assess the impacts of ESR and corruption prior 2002. Similarly, 
the final year 2013, represents the last year for which data are available on electricity 
consumption per capita and T&D losses at the time we conducted the analyses. Also, we do 
not have complete data for all years on the 47 countries especially as we change the 
performance indicators and the sample size changes depending on the performance indicator 
being analysed.
9
 Table 3 summarises summary statistics of the variables used. 
As noted, the three performance indicators (technical, welfare and economic impacts) are 
measured by per capita T&D losses (losper)
10
, per capita electricity consumption (access)
11
, 
GDP per capita (gdpper). Data on losper and access (relabelled as comper) and used as a 
control variable in the economic impact regression) are obtained from the United States 
Energy Information Agency database, while data on gdpper is from the World Bank 
Development Indicator Database. Data on corruption is from Kaufmann et al. (2010) included 
in World Bank’s Governance Indicator Database, which includes annual country-level data. 
The corruption index, which measures corruption in both public and private sectors, ranges 
from -2.5 (highly corrupt) to 2.5 (highly clean). Data on ira was obtained from Eberhard et al. 
(2016) and updated with data from Burundi, Cape Verde, Madagascar, Seychelles and São 
Tomé and Príncipe electricity regulatory agencies’ websites.12 Data on priv was obtained 
from the World Bank Infrastructure Database. 
                                                          
9
 The different sample sizes were reported at the bottom of three estimation results tables in the next section. 
10
 The losses and access variables have been averaged by total population data from the World Bank’s 
development indicators database to obtain a per capita measure before estimations. 
11
 See Appendix B for using this measure as a proxy for access to electricity relative to alternative indicators. 
12 See Burundi’s Drinking Water and Electricity Sector Control and Regulation Agency (ACR): 
https://www.ppbdi.com/index.php/extras/economie-sciences-education-formation/3397-ministere-de-l-energie-
et-des-mines-regulation-du-secteur-de-l-eau-potable-et-de-l-electricite, Cape Verde Agência de Regulação 
Económica: http://www.are.cv/index.php, Madagascar office de régulation de l'electricité: http://www.ore.mg/, 
The Seychelles Energy Commission (SEC): http://www.sec.sc/, São Tomé and Príncipe Autoridade Geral de 
Regulação: http://www.ager-stp.org/index.php/pt/. 
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Variables  
Names 
Labels Unit Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
Electricity Gen., Per Capita  genper KWh per capita  562 440 0.88 10 5310 
Regulator ira Dummy 564 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Privatisation priv Dummy 564 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Corruption cor Index 564 -0.60 0.58 -1.71 1.25 
Urbanisation urban % 562 38.49 16.27 8.68 86.66 
Elect. Consumption, Per Capita access KWh per capita 562 630 1.47 10 10,570 
Household Elect. Consumption hols KWh per HH 528 1,743 5,804 4 41,173 
Export export % 528 35.11 22.38 4.43 122.26
*
 
Industrialization  ind % 522 26.24 14.30 3.33 84.28 
Population pop Millions Inhab. 562 17.13 26.15 0.08 170 
Trans./Dist. Losses, Per Capita  losper KWh/Mill. Inhab. 521 68.56 91.96 0.19 485.60 
GDP, Per Capita gdpper 2010 US$/Inhab. 562 2,138 3,250 194 20,172 
Population Density popden Inhab./km
2
 562 86.63 112.45 2.38 620.03 
Structure struc Dummy 564 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Table 3: Summary statistics of data 
Note: We have log transformed the variables losper, genper, access, hols and gdpper  
prior to the estimations 
*Equatorial Guinea is a notable exception with exports being larger than the GDP 
 
 
Data for the control variables urban and genper were obtained from the World Bank’s 
Development Indicators and the United States Energy Information Agency respectively. Data 
for struc was obtained from World Bank’s Development Indicators Database and updated 
with data from African Development Bank’s Energy Utilities Database, included in the 
Africa Infrastructure Knowledge Program. In addition, the data on hols was obtained from 
the United Nation’s Energy Statistics Database. The countries included in our sample are 
listed in Appendix C.  
Finally, in order to check the robustness of our main results, we have added three explanatory 
variables - share of industrial output (ind), trade openness (export) and population density 
(popden) - to the three electricity reform performance equations to be analysed in alternative 
estimations.
13
 The data for these variables were obtained from the World Bank’s 
Development Indicators Database. 
 
 
                                                          
13
 The results of the robustness checks are presented and discussed in Appendix D. 
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5. Results 
In this section, we present and discuss the estimation results of the performance equations 
along the three dimensions of performance (technical, welfare and economic impacts) using 
dynamic panel Sys-GMM estimator.
14
 The first subsection discusses the estimates of the 
T&D energy losses equation, the second subsection estimates energy consumption per capita 
access, whilst the third subsection discuss the estimates of GDP per capita equation. 
Regression statistics of the three estimations (Tables 4-6) indicate that all models fit the data 
well. The test statistics indicates that there is first order serial correlation AR (1) but not at the 
second order AR (2), while the Hansen test of model specification and over-identifying 
restrictions indicates that all three models are correctly specified with appropriate 
instruments. Our estimation strategy differs from earlier studies who use static models to 
analyse the impacts of ESR on performance (Zhang et al., 2008; Estache et al., 2009; Wren-
Lewis, 2015). 
5.1. Technical Impact – T&D losses 
The immediate impacts of ESR are the technical improvements on the sector. The estimates 
of the Sys-GMM estimation in Table 4 shows that, the coefficient of cor is positive and 
highly significant, suggesting that an increase in the corruption index is associated with 
reductions in efficiency particularly in countries without private sector participation. Thus, 
corruption can be considered here as a major source of inefficiency in SSA countries and 
therefore, decreasing it could have enormous positive impact on technical efficiency. This 
result is similar to the results obtained by other researchers who find a positive relationship 
between corruption and inefficiency (Dal Bó, 2006; Estache and Trujillo, 2009; Dal Bó and 
Rossi, 2007; and Wren-Lewis, 2015). 
The coefficient of ira is not significant suggesting that, creation of IRAs has no statistical 
effect on technical efficiency. The negative coefficient for priv indicates that, countries with 
private sector participation are associated with a statistically significant improvement in 
technical efficiency during the study period. Evidence of this cuts across the whole of SSA 
where for example, introduction of private sector participation in countries such as Namibia, 
Nigeria, Uganda and Mali, which have greatly improved efficiency (Clark et al., 2005). 
Moreover, this result is consistent with earlier studies that find private sector participation in 
electricity markets is associated with technical efficiency improvements (e.g., Andres et al., 
2008; Nagayama, 2007; Balza et al., 2013). However, Smith (2004) and Zhang et al. (2008) 
find that certain electricity reform policies such as regulation and privatisation are associated 
with the deterioration of efficiency. 
Do implementations of ESR reduce the negative influence of corruption on technical 
efficiency? The answer depends on the coefficient estimates of the two interaction terms 
iraXcor and privXcor included in Equation (2). The coefficient of iraXcor is not significant 
                                                          
14
 Although, we estimate our model with the Sys-GMM estimator, however for completeness, we present pooled 
OLS regressions results in Appendix E. 
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suggesting that creations of IRAs have no any statistical influence on relation between 
corruption and technical efficiency. Conversely, the coefficient estimate also suggests that 
corruption has not interfered with regulatory activities. The coefficient of the privXcor 
interaction term is negative and significant suggesting that, SSA countries that have opened 
their electricity markets to private sector participation have greatly offset the negative 
influence of corruption on efficiency. The coefficient of the interaction term iraXpriv is not 
significant indicating that regulation of the privatised networks has had no effect on the 
efficiency of the utilities and owners have not interfered with regulatory activities. 
Regarding the control variables included in the estimation, the negative and significant 
coefficients of struc and urban suggest that, countries that have unbundled sectors and 
increased the size of their electricity markets have improved technical efficiency. On the 
contrary, the coefficient of hols suggests that increased electricity consumption by 
households have led to efficiency deterioration during the period covered by our study. The 
coefficient of the time trend is not significant. It should be noted that this and the subsequent 
results should be interpreted with some caution since the dummies used as proxies are 
nominal values and thus will not capture the intensity of reform policies among countries in 
the sample. Moreover, the measure of corruption used is at best the perception of corruption, 
which could be different from reality. 
 
Technical Impact (losper) 
Variables  Est. t-stat. 
Ln losper(t-1) 0.857*** 19.02 
cor 1.035*** 4.30 
ira 0.174 0.96 
priv -0.533*** -3.10 
iraXcor 0.003 0.03 
privXcor -0.955*** -4.51 
iraXpriv -0.125 -0.86 
Ln hols 0.065** 2.26 
struc -0.551*** -3.76 
urban 0.004* 1.87 
time 0.003 1.16 
No of obs.  444 
Countries  41 
Instruments  36 
AR(1) test (p value)  -2.28 (0.023) 
AR(2) test (p value)  0.09 (0.925) 
Hansen test (p value)  23.59 (0.485) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4: Two-Step GMM Estimates of T&D Losses Equation 
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5.2. Welfare Impact (access) - Per Capita Electricity Consumption 
The main and ultimate aim of electricity reforms in developing countries has been to improve 
the socio-economic welfare of the population. The parameter estimates of the performance 
equation (access) are presented in Table 5. The estimated coefficient of cor is negative and 
significant, suggesting that, an increase in corruption decreases access to electricity services. 
This is consistent with similar findings obtained by other researchers on how corruption 
reduces the quality and quantity of publicly consumed services (e.g., Fredriksson et al., 2004; 
Estache et al., 2009).  
The coefficient of the IRA dummy is positive and significant, indicating that for the period 
covered by our study, countries that have created IRAs have boosted access to electricity 
services. This result contrasts with the result obtained by Estache et al. (2009) who associated 
the creations of an IRAs with a statistically significant reduction in access rates. The 
coefficient of priv is not significant indicating that the privatisation policies have no 
significant effect on the access rates. The estimate also contrasts with the findings of earlier 
studies such as Sihag et al. (2007) and Bhattacharyya (2006) who find that reforms policies 
(e.g., privatization) have led to a decline in access the rates in the State of Orissa in India. 
The coefficient of the interaction term iraXcor is positive and significant indicating that, 
creations of IRAs have offset the negative influence of corruption on access rates. The 
coefficient estimate of the interaction privXcor, is not significant suggesting that private 
sector participation has not been effective in addressing the negative influence of corruption. 
It may also suggest that corruption has not constrained the efforts of privatised utilities to 
increase access to electricity services. 
Regardless of the impacts of individual reform policies, the coefficient of the interaction term 
iraXpriv suggests that together they exert a statistically significant decreasing effect on access 
to electricity. In other words, although the creation of IRAs have led to increase in access 
rates while privatisation has no effect, their interaction have led to reductions in access rates 
in SSA countries. This may be attributed to the conflicting objectives between independent 
regulators and private utilities. For example, independent regulation may be keen to extend 
electricity services to the mostly un-electrified poor areas, while private firms may be 
motivated by profit motive and thus have no incentives to extend the electricity service to 
new low-income and low-usage consumers. 
The coefficients of gdpper, urban and struc are all not significant suggesting that income 
level, the size of/and structure electricity markets have no impacts on electrification rates. 
The electricity generation per capita variable (genper) is positive and highly significant 
indicating that further increases in electricity generation leads to increase in access rates. The 
time trend is not significant. 
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Welfare Impact (access) 
Variables  Est. t-stat. 
   
Ln access(t-1) 0.846*** 23.13 
cor -0.147* -1.91 
ira 0.281*** 4.04 
priv 0.124 1.37 
iraXcor 0.231*** 4.63 
privXcor 0.042 0.50 
iraXpriv -0.146*** -2.63 
Ln genper 0.178*** 5.03 
Ln gdpper -0.058 -1.45 
struc 0.003 0.16 
urban 0.001 1.20 
time 0.002 1.48 
No of obs.  515 
Countries  47 
Instruments  41 
AR(1) test (p value)  -4.17 (0.000) 
AR(2) test (p value)  -1.62 (0.106) 
Hansen test (p value)  26.69 (0.535) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5: Two-step GMM Estimates of Per Capita Energy Consumption 
 
5.3. Economic Impact - GDP Per Capita 
The results indicate that the implementation of electricity reforms in SSA countries have the 
potential to reduce the negative influence of corruption on electricity sector performance. The 
implementations of reforms in developing countries are noted to have anticorruption 
potentials to reduce the effects of corruption on economic development (World Bank, 2000). 
Therefore, we expect the implementation of reforms in SSA to enhance economic 
performance through two channels. First, by enhancing the overall performance of the sector 
(i.e., by improving technical efficiency and extending services to those without access). 
Second, as part of wider economic reforms, often underpinned by an anticorruption strategy, 
the reforms can also reduce the effects of corruption on economic performance. The 
coefficient estimates of privXcor and iraXcor are shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
In Table 6, where gdpper is a dependent variable in the performance equation, the coefficient 
of cor is negative and significant. This is consistent with other well established findings on 
the relationship between these two variables (e.g., Barreto, 2000; Rose-Ackerman 1999; 
Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Thus, an increase in the control of corruption index in a country is 
associated with a decrease in per capita GDP. The coefficient of ira is positive and not 
significant, suggesting that creation of IRAs hass not had impact on the level of income. 
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The coefficient of priv is also positive and significant indicating that private sector 
investments have boosted economic performance of SSA reforming countries. A similar 
result was also obtain by Chisari et al. (1999) who find privatization of electricity generation 
and distribution assets led to positive economic performance in Argentina. Similarly, the 
estimate of priv confirms the argument by the IMF that ESR policies such as privatization has 
the potential to free up government energy subsidies and thereby boost economic 
performance over the long run (IMF, 2013). 
Do implementations reform policies reduce the negative association between corruption and 
economic growth? The coefficient of iraXcor is not significant suggesting, that, for the period 
of this study, countries that established IRAs have not exerted beneficial effects on the 
negative association between corruption and per capita GDP nor has corruption affected the 
relation between regulation and economic performance. This is inconsistent with Jalilian et 
al. (2007) who stressed the importance of credible and independent regulation on economic 
growth. The coefficient of privXcor is positive and significant indicating that, countries that 
open their doors to private sector investments have reduce the negative association between 
corruption and per capita GDP and thus they have succeeded in boosting their income levels. 
The coefficient of iraXpriv is not significant suggesting that the interaction of the regulator 
and privatisation does not exert an influence on the economic performance. 
 
Economic Impact (gdpper) 
Variables  Est. t-stat. 
   
Ln gdpper(t-1) 0.984** 64.15 
cor -0.092*** -2.60 
ira 0.016 0.57 
priv 0.107*** 2.86 
iraXcor 0.026 0.92 
privXcor 0.071* 1.68 
iraXpriv -0.032 -1.18 
Ln comper 0.014* 1.72 
struc -0.004 -1.41 
urban -0.000 -0.79 
time -0.001** -2.53 
No of obs.  515 
Countries  47 
Instruments  36 
AR(1) test (p value)  -2.90 (0.004) 
AR(2) test (p value)  -1.29 (0.196) 
Hansen test (p value)  22.46 (0.552) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6: Two-step GMM Estimates of Income Growth Equation 
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Of the three control variables included in the model, only the coefficient of per capita 
electricity consumption (comper) is positive and significant. This suggests that an increase in 
energy consumption impacts positively on per capita GDP, while the structure (struc) and 
size (urban) of electricity markets have no effects on level of income after controlling for the 
effect of corruption. However, the time trend is significant and negative, which may indicate 
the adverse effect of decreasing technical progress on the region’s economic performance 
over the period covered by our study. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Sub-Saharan African countries are noted to be among the most corrupt countries of the world. 
As a result, various studies have investigated how corruption have continued to constrain the 
economic development of these countries through some transmission channels. However, one 
important transmission channel not yet investigated is the operation and regulation of 
electricity networks. Studies that investigated this channel using data on other developing 
regions find evidence that corruption can increase system losses, restrict electricity services 
to urban areas and reduce income levels. 
In order to reduce the influence of corruption in the electricity sector, reformers advocated for 
unbundling of state-owned electric utilities vertically (generation, transmission, distribution 
and retailing) and horizontally (generation and retailing). The unbundled parts that are 
amenable to competition would be sold to the private sector and an independent regulatory 
agency created by the state would then supervise and regulate the natural monopoly-prone 
parts of the sector. 
After more than two decades of reforms in SSA countries, we investigate whether these 
reforms have reduced the influence of corruption on technical efficiency of utilities and if 
efficiency gains have been translated into increase in access rates and income growth. The 
paper uses panel data and a dynamic panel estimator to investigate the effects of corruption 
on electricity sector performance. Using World Bank’s control of corruption perception 
index, the paper shows that corruption has an adverse and statistically significant effect on 
the three indicators of electricity sector performance - technical efficiency, access rates and 
economic performance. This finding adds to the body of evidence that stress the detrimental 
impacts of corruption on economic development and electricity sector performance. 
We find that creation of independent regulation and private sector participation, not only have 
the potential to enhance the utilities’ performance but have also wider economic benefits. 
Specifically, we find that independent regulation has the potential to increase social welfare 
directly and indirectly by reducing the association between corruption and electricity access 
rates. We also show that private sector participation is associated with improved technical 
efficiency and increased economic performance, while we find privatization policies have no 
statistically significant impact on access rates. 
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More importantly, we analyse the way corruption interacts with the two reform policies and 
how these interactions impact on the three indicators of performance. The creations of 
independent regulators has substantially reduced the adverse association between corruption 
and access rates, while they have not mitigated the often-cited negative association between 
corruption and income level and nor the association between corruption and technical 
efficiency. However, private sector participation has offset the adverse effects of corruption 
on technical efficiency and income, while they have no impact on the association between 
corruption and access rates. 
These results are robust after controlling for other variables that also have impacts on the 
performance of the electricity sector. Thus, our results suggest that implementation of well-
designed micro level electricity reforms have the potential not only to boost the firms’ 
economic performance directly, they would also indirectly reduce the negative effects of 
macro-level institutional deficiencies such as corruption on micro and macro levels indicators 
of performance. Therefore, implementation of electricity reforms in developing countries can 
not only enhance the performance of the electricity sector, but would also boost economic 
performance, since improvements in technical efficiency can be translated into increased 
access rates and income growth. 
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 Appendix A 
 
Country 
Year of 
financial 
closure 
Name of Project 
Subtype of 
PPI 
Project 
status 
Segment 
Chad 2000 
Societe Tchadienne d’Eau et 
d’Electricite (STEE) 
Management 
contract 
Cancelled 
G*, T** 
& D*** 
Gabon 1993 
Societe Africaine de Gestion et 
d’Investissement (SAGI) 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Gambia, The 1993 
Management Service Gambia 
(MSG) 
Lease 
contract 
Cancelled G, T & D 
Gambia, The 2006 
National Water and Electricity 
Company Management 
Contract 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G 
Ghana 1994 
Electricity Corporation of 
Ghana 
Management 
contract 
Concluded D 
Guinea-
Bissau 
1991 
Electricidade e Aguas de 
Guinea-Bissau 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Kenya 2006 
Kenya Power and Lighting 
Company Management 
Contract 
Management 
contract 
Concluded T & D 
Lesotho 2002 
Lesotho Electricity 
Corporation (LEC) 
Management 
contract 
Active G, T & D 
Liberia 2010 
Liberia Electricity Corporation 
Management Contract 
Management 
contract 
Active T & D 
Madagascar 2005 Jiro syRano Malagasy (Jirama) 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Malawi 2001 
Electricity Supply Corporation 
of Malawi Ltd (ESCOM) 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Mali 1994 
Electricite et Eau du Mali 
(Management) 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Namibia 1996 Northern Electricity 
Lease 
contract 
Concluded D 
Namibia 2000 Reho-Electricity 
Lease 
contract 
Active D 
Rwanda 2003 Electrogaz 
Management 
contract 
Cancelled G, T & D 
Rwanda 2003 Electrogaz 
Management 
contract 
Cancelled G, T & D 
São Tomé & 
Principe 
1993 
Empresa de Agua e 
Electricidade 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Tanzania 2002 
Tanzania Electricity Supply 
Company (TANESCO) 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Togo 1997 
Companie Energie Electrique 
du Togo 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G & D 
*Generation, **Transmission and ***Distribution 
 
Table A1. Types of management contracts in SSA 
Source: World Bank PPI database 
 
 Appendix B: Electricity Consumption Per Capita as a Proxy for Access 
Rates 
 
To assess the impacts of corruption and ESR on access rates, we use per capita electricity 
consumption as dependent variable in Equation (1). Although this choice of dependent 
variable may have some limitations, there are several reasons why it is a better proxy than 
other two alternative measures commonly used by other scholars: IEA data on electricity 
access rates and night-time satellite imagery data captured by the US Defence Meteorological 
Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS).a 
The IEA data, which was first compiled in the “World Energy Outlook, 2002”, was based on 
various sources such as countries’ self-assessed reports (World Bank and IEA, 2015), which 
magnifies the sources of errors and thus leads to overestimation of access rates (Min, 2010). 
Another drawback of the IEA data is that, it only indicates the extent of electricity 
infrastructure provision, and therefore is silent on quality, reliability and whether services has 
been consumed or not (World Bank and IEA, 2015; Ahlborg et al., 2015).
b
 
Similarly, night-time satellite imagery has some serious drawbacks. For example, the 
measure includes people without access to electricity services residing in electrified towns 
(Doll and Pachauri, 2010). As a result, its reliability as an indicator of access rate is weak 
since it only measures stable outdoor lights, which can be a major problem in SSA countries 
where there are high incidences of load shedding (World Bank, 2009).
c
 
Therefore, using consumption per capita other than connection rates or satellite imagery as 
dependent variable has the advantage of assessing how consumers were able to translate 
access to real use, rather than just the physical extension of electricity infrastructures. As 
result, if there are significant changes in service reliability, we expect that consumption to be 
adversely affected. Moreover, as Ahlborg et al. (2015) have noted, using a per capita measure 
rather measuring average consumption among the electrified minority has the advantage of 
comparing development patterns across SSA countries of different population sizes. 
Furthermore, the per capita measure allows for the assessment of whether consumption levels 
have kept pace with population growth in each country. Thus, the proxy is a good indicator of 
whether ESR policies have improved quality, increase access to hitherto derived areas, and/or 
whether the population of those already connected have increased over time. 
 
                                                          
a
The data is being archived and provided to researchers by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) at its National Geophysical Data Centre. 
b
 For further discussion, see Ahlborg et al. (2015). 
c
 For further shortcomings of this data, see Doll and Pachauri (2010). 
 Appendix C 
 
Angola Gabon Niger 
Benin The Gambia Nigeria 
Botswana Ghana Rwanda 
Burkina Faso Guinea Sao Tome and Principe 
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Senegal 
Cape Verde Kenya Seychelles 
Cameroon Lesotho Sierra Leone 
Central Africa Republic Liberia South Africa 
Comoros Madagascar Sudan 
Congo Democratic Republic Malawi Swaziland 
Congo Republic Mali Tanzania 
Djibouti Mauritania Togo 
Equatorial Guinea Mauritius Uganda 
Eritrea Mozambique Zambia 
Ethiopia Namibia Zimbabwe 
Chad  Cote d’Ivoire  
Table B1. SSA countries included in the analysis 
 
 Appendix D: Robustness Analyses 
 
It is possible that the coefficient estimates in Tables 4, 5 and 6 may suffer from omitted-
variable bias. Here we check the robustness of our results by adding additional explanatory 
variables in the model, one at a time to both the performance and growth equations to see if 
this would significantly affect the results. 
Cubbin and Stern (2006) argue that a rapid growing share of industrial output (e.g., in heavy 
industry such as petrochemicals, aluminium, manufacturing) is expected to increase the 
demand for electricity. Similarly, Kaldor (1970) and Cornwall (1977) argue that expansion of 
the industrial sector is a driving force for economic development. Thus, excluding this 
variable (ind) from both the performance and growth equations could, potentially, lead to 
biased estimates of the effects of ESR and corruption on the three indicators of performance. 
We therefore include the share of industrial value added as a percentage of GDP as an 
additional regressor in three equations. Several authors also find the degree of openness of an 
economy to influence electricity sector performance (e.g., Zhang et al., 2008). We also 
include exports (export) as percentage of GDP as an additional regressor in the performance 
equation. The data for export is obtained from the World Bank governance indicators 
database. 
Furthermore, several studies include a variable measuring population density to assess the 
ability of both public and private utilities to extend cheap and affordable electricity to 
populations spread over vast areas (e.g., Ahlborg et al., 2015; Estache et al., 2009; Min, 
2010). The data is from the World Bank development indicators database. 
Results of this exercise are presented in Tables D1, D2 and D3. Columns 1, 3 and 5 of each 
table presents the parameter estimates of the models when ind, export and popden are added, 
one at time, as an additional regressors to the three performance regressions. The coefficients 
of cor, ira, priv remained significant/not significant depending on the performance indicator 
with the expected signs regardless of the additional regressors added to the three equations. 
Similarly, the two interactions of interest (iraXcor and priXcor) remain significant/not 
significant regardless of extra additions to the three regressions. 
Therefore, the additional inclusions do not significantly alter the estimates of the coefficients 
for cor, ira and priv. More importantly, the structure of the two interaction terms (iraXcor 
and privXcor) estimates remain remarkably stable regardless of which of the variables is 
added to the performance estimations. These results seem to indicate that the estimates 
presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6 are not suffering from omitted-variable bias. 
 
  
Technical Impact 
 ind ind + export ind + export + popden 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables estimates t-statistic estimates t-statistic estimates t-statistic 
       
Ln losper(t-1) 0.794*** 16.01 0.827*** 22.17 0.825*** 23.34 
Cor 1.005*** 3.85 1.047*** 4.84 1.051*** 4.95 
Ira 0.142 0.81 0.105 0.42 0.180 0.67 
Priv -0.471*** -2.66 -0.540*** -3.73 -0.552*** -3.80 
iraXcor -0.196 -1.60 -0.131 -0.87 -0.090 -0.58 
privXcor -0.776*** -4.01 -0.812*** -6.71 -0.840*** -6.85 
iraXpriv -0.197 -1.44 -0.195 -1.09 -0.232 -1.25 
Ln hols 0.064** 2.11 0.074** 2.38 0.062* 1.76 
Struc -0.604*** -3.62 -0.637*** -3.84 -0.572*** -3.09 
Urban 0.005 1.41 0.004 1.49 0.005* 1.82 
Ind 0.008*** 3.07 0.015*** 4.17 0.016*** 4.01 
Export   -0.009*** -3.53 -0.010*** -3.38 
Ln popden     -0.0247 -1.06 
Time 0.001 0.07 0.006 1.68 0.007* 1.84 
       
Observations  424  398  398 
Number of countries   40  39  39 
Instruments   34  38  39 
AR(1) test (p value)  -2.30(0.022)  -2.22(0.026)  -2.22(0.026) 
AR(2) test (p value)  0.02(0.987)  0.03(0.975)  0.04(0.968) 
Hansen test (p value)  17.18(0.700)  26.43(0.332
) 
 26.05(0.351) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table D1: Two-step GMM estimates of T&D losses equation 
 
  
Welfare Impact 
 ind ind + export ind + export + popden 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
       
Ln access(t-1) 0.912*** 30.64 0.936*** 33.68 0.854*** 13.52 
cor -0.300*** -4.16 -0.208*** -2.83 -0.195** -2.01 
1ra 0182*** 3.40 0.130** 2.19 0.299*** 3.51 
Priv 0.109 1.28 -0.006 -0.15 0.188 1.40 
iraXcor 0.210*** 3.18 0.222*** 3.86 0.198** 2.42 
privXcor 0.128 1.41 0.020 0.59 0.126 1.07 
iraXpriv -0.022 -0.27 0.047 0.78 -0.142 -1.40 
Ln genper 0.123*** 3.93 0.050*** 2.33 0.173*** 6.04 
Ln gdpper 0.001 0.03 0.071* 1.91 0.034 0.50 
struc -0441 -1.21 -0.053 -0.70 -0.005 -0.03 
urban 0.001 0.38 -0.001 -1.30 0.001 0.43 
ind -0.013*** -4.28 -0.004** -2.47 -0.006*** -2.89 
export   0.002** 2.22 0.002** 2.49 
Ln popden     0.029 0.41 
time -0.000 -0.27 0.000 0.41 -0.002 -0.56 
       
Observations  480  454  452 
Number of countries  45  44  44 
Instruments   62  63  72 
AR(1) test (p value)  -4.12(0.000)  -4.12(0.000)  -3.91(0.000) 
AR(2) test (p value)  -1.49(0.137)  --1.43(0.153)  -1.36(0.174) 
Hansen test (p value)  32.96(0.952)  31.45(0.969)  31.37(0.997) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table D2: Two-step GMM estimates of per capita energy consumption equation 
 
  
Economic impact 
 Ind ind + export ind + export + popden 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
       
Ln gdpper(t-1) 0.947*** 71.26 0.860*** 25.70 0.934*** 30.57 
cor -0.087** -2.20 -0.086** -2.17 -0.137*** -3.57 
ira 0.018 0.84 0.030 1.02 0.054 1.32 
priv 0.158*** 4.50 0.213*** 6.35 0.169*** 5.65 
iraXcor -0.041 -1.38 -0.059 -1.08 -0.007 -0.24 
privXcor 0.167*** 4.64 0.223*** 7.48 0.155*** 3.69 
iraXpriv -0.050*** -2.62 -0.046 -1.31 -0.035 -1.14 
Ln comper 0.014* 1.93 0.009 1.02 0.007 0.56 
struc 0.015 1.49 0.063*** 3.29 0.020 0.69 
urban 0.000 0.50 0.003*** 3.23 0.000 0.03 
ind 0.001 1.27 -0.001** -2.21 -0.001* -1.80 
export   0.004*** 8.80 0.004*** 10.11 
Ln popden     -0.014 -0.76 
time -0.001*** -3.42 -0.002*** -3.07 -0.003*** -5.57 
       
Observations  480  458  452 
Number of countries  45  44  44 
Instruments   41  62  71 
AR(1) test (p value)  -3.09(0.002)  -2.97(0.003)  -3.04(0.002) 
AR(2) test (p value)  -1.58(0.113)  -1.55(0.121)  -1.44(0.149) 
Hansen test (p value)  21.72(0.794)  28.60(0.988)  33.73(0.992) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table D3. Two-step GMM Estimates of Income Growth Equation 
 
 Appendix E: OLS Estimates of the Performance Equation  
   (Energy Losses, Access Rates and Income) 
 
These estimates, although inconsistent due uncontrolled unobserved heterogeneity and 
simultaneity, show the potential of some ESR policies to reduce the adverse relationship 
between corruption and performance of reforms. 
 
 Technical Impact Welfare Impact Economic Impact 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
       
cor 1.651*** 6.80 0.320*** 3.01 0.702*** 5.79 
ira 0.099 0.37 0.437*** 3.95 -0.323** -2.26 
priv -0.770*** -3.08 -0.181** -1.98 0.191 1.35 
iraXcor -0.320* -1.93 0.304** 2.25 -0.518*** -4.11 
privXcor -0.931*** -3.44 0.286*** 2.59 -0.228 -1.61 
iraXpriv -0.103 -0.41 -0.107 -1.04 -0.196 -1.36 
struc 0.442*** 3.06 0.443*** 3.40 0.226*** 3.28 
urban 0.046*** 18.36 0.001 0.54 0.027*** 14.12 
Ln hols 0.261*** 8.03     
Ln comper     0.218*** 5.20 
Ln gdpper   0.582*** 10.69   
Ln genper   0.539*** 13.31   
time -0.004 -0.29 0.007 0.78 0.006 0.74 
constant -12.761*** -48.69 -4.725*** -10.70 6.031*** 41.48 
 
No. of countries 41 
485 
0.534 
47 
562 
0.796 
47 
526 
0.566 
No. Obs. 
Adj. R
2 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table E1: Estimates of the pooled OLS regression 
